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In New Zealand parents have the legal right to seek and make decisions about medical 
treatment and interventions on behalf of their children. Such is part of the bundle 
of rights and responsibilities that come with guardianship. Parents exercise authority 
over a child’s medical treatment until the child is competent enough to make such 
decisions in or his or her own right. 
This report looks at whether genetic testing of children raises new issues that require 
a different paradigm in terms of medical decision-making for children. Does genetic 
testing raise new issues or concerns that are not effectively addressed under existing 
frameworks? Who should decide whether a child undergoes a genetic test: a child; 
a parent; a health professional; the State? If minors generally do not make medical 
decisions on their own behalf, at what age are or should they be recognised as 
competent to do so? At what age should they be recognised as competent to consent 
to or refuse to consent to a genetic test? 
This analysis regarding regulation of genetic testing of minors rests upon the premise 
that there is a need to respect the autonomy of minors, no matter what their age. This 
premise results in two different arguments. First, that competent minors should be 
genetically tested upon their own request or informed consent, in deference to their 
autonomy. Secondly, that minors too young to make their own decisions should not 
be genetically tested, in deference to their future autonomy. 
The underlying principle of respect for autonomy means that the limited evidence 
regarding benefits and harms also favours genetic testing of competent minors upon 
request or their own informed consent; adults may seek and consent to genetic 
testing, despite the limited evidence about the effects. Notwithstanding, the evidence 
of benefits and harms of genetic testing of competent minors is equivocal at best, and 
arguably appears to support the view that more benefits than harms may arise from 
such testing.
The principle of respect for autonomy requires us to be more cautious in respect of 
younger children where there is only limited evidence regarding benefits and harms. 
Where the outcomes of imposed testing are unknown and may include some harm, 
then there is even greater reason, in terms of their future autonomy, for younger 
children to make their own decision about testing and for it to be respected. The need 
to respect their autonomy overrides any parental rights or family concerns which 
may prompt a request for genetic testing, unless very serious harm will come to the 
child as a result of not acceding to parental wishes in respect of testing. 
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Respect for autonomy is the fundamental principle upon which this analysis is based 
because, regardless of moral or ethical premises, the law protects individual rights to 
self-determination. 
We conclude that predictive or carrier testing of children who cannot give their own 
informed consent is to be discouraged, primarily because it infringes the child’s 
autonomy, and also because of the lack of evidence about whether such testing is 
beneficial or harmful. However, we do not suggest that such testing should be 
legislated against, as has been done in Norway. There needs to be room for some 
discretion for those situations in which the child will be better off being tested than 
not, limited as those circumstances might be. It is not the State’s place to make these 
decisions instead of parents and health professionals. 
We conclude that our existing medico-legal framework allows competent minors to 
give their own informed consent to genetic testing. However, we suggest that New 
Zealand-specific professional guidelines on genetic testing of minors, reinforcing 
the legal capacity of competent minors, would better protect their position, whilst 
also raising awareness of the ethical, legal and social implications of genetic testing 
amongst a wider circle of health professionals, rather than just clinical geneticists. 
  what is a chilD or minor?
While there are common notions2 of what a ‘child’ is there have been various 
conceptions regarding to whom the terms ‘minor’ or ‘child’ apply across history, 
disciplines and jurisdictions. The definition or categorisation often turns upon the 
purposes for which it is sought. 
The most important meanings of the terms ‘child’ and ‘minor’ for the purposes of 
this part of the report are the legal definitions. There is no single overriding definition 
of ‘child’ for the purposes of all New Zealand law,3 and children are given various 
rights, responsibilities and protections at divergent ages.4 It can thus be difficult to 
categorically state who is legally a ‘child’ in New Zealand. The definition very much 
depends on the context.5 Such variations can be confusing but also beneficial, by 
reflecting children’s increasing competency as they develop. Provisions requiring that 
children be dealt with in accordance with their age and maturity also recognise the 
fact that individual children mature at different times. 
The most relevant definitions of ‘child’ for the purposes of this section of the report 
are contained within the Care of Children Act (COCA) 2004 and the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCROC). 
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Note that while both instruments set an arbitrary age limit in terms what age group is 
covered by the term ‘child’, they both also give significant recognition to the evolving 
capacities of children, and the need to involve children of all ages (where possible) in 
decisions affecting them. 
The COCA 2004 defines a child as ‘a person under the age of 18 years’. The duties, 
powers, rights and responsibilities of guardianship terminate when the child turns 
eighteen; the child marries or enters into a civil union; the child lives with another 
person as a de facto partner; or it is ordered by the Court (section 28, COCA 2004). 
Pursuant to article 1 of UNCROC a child means ‘every human being below the age 
of eighteen years unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained 
earlier.’
Thus, for the purposes of this section of the report, the terms ‘child’ and ‘minor’ refer 
to children under the age of eighteen years. We in no way mean to diminish persons 
under the age of eighteen by referring to them by the somewhat archaic word ‘minor’ 
– we merely use the expression as the most appropriate term in the legal context at 
this time, and to avoid any confusion caused by using the word ‘child’ (which can of 
course also refer to adult	children). 
2  what is genetic testing?
The same genetic tests that can be carried out on adults to identify gene variants or 
genetic mutations can also be carried out on minors. 
2.  symptomatic testing
Figure 1: Symptomatic	testing
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Symptomatic testing is undertaken as part of routine medical care when a minor 
presents with symptoms of a disorder that may have a genetic basis. For example, testing 
for fragile X is part of a routine medical work-up for a child with developmental and 
speech delay.6 For some conditions such as cystic fibrosis there may be interventions 
available that can alleviate some of the symptoms of the disorder. For others, such 
as Batten’s disease (a fatal neurodegenerative disorder characterised by mental 
impairment and progressive loss of sight and motor skills), little can be done to halt 
the symptoms and progress of the disorder.7 
2.2  Predictive testing
Predictive testing can be presymptomatic i.e. for conditions with 100 per cent 
penetrance (such as Huntington disease), or probabilistic8 i.e. indicating susceptibility 
to a condition (e.g. BRCA 1 and BRCA 2 mutations and breast and ovarian cancer). 
Most predictive tests are for susceptibility. 
Both presymptomatic and susceptibility tests can be carried out for early-onset 
conditions, which usually manifest in childhood or adolescence (e.g. retinoblastoma 
and Familial Adenomatous Polyposis),9 or late-onset conditions, which manifest 
later in life (e.g. Huntington disease).10 
For some heritable genetic disorders there may be medical interventions available to 
prevent or delay the onset of the condition or to effectively manage or minimise the 
symptoms (‘treatment’). For others (e.g. most neurodegenerative disorders) there is 
often no effective medical prophylaxis or treatment available (‘no treatment’).
When a genetic mutation is not fully penetrant, and thus only indicates varying 
degrees of susceptibility to a disorder, the risk of developing the associated disorder 
varies according to a number of factors. These include the particular gene(s) or 
genetic variation(s) in question; the total genetic environment;11 the individual and 
the lifestyle involved; and environmental factors. A great deal of uncertainty lingers – 
further factors that might affect a person’s likelihood of getting a particular disorder 
remain unknown.
It is important to note that even when a genetic mutation is presymptomatic or fully 
penetrant, the genetic test results cannot always predict how severe the manifestation 
(or the expressivity) of the disorder will be in the particular person tested. That is, it 
currently can be very difficult to tell how mildly or severely the disorder will present 
in the person tested.
Additionally, there are no guarantees as to the age of onset of any of these types 
of conditions. There is still a great deal of residual uncertainty regarding the 
interpretation of presymptomatic genetic test results.
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Figure 2: Predictive	testing
2.  carrier testing
Carrier testing is also available to determine whether a minor carries a recessive 
autosomal or X-linked genetic mutation, or a major chromosomal mutation, for a 
condition that he or she may pass on to future offspring. Examples include cystic 
fibrosis, Tay-Sachs, sickle-cell disease and fragile X syndrome.
There is a difference in implication between carrying an autosomal recessive mutation, 
and carrying an X-linked mutation. A female carrier of an X–linked mutation has a 
50 per cent chance of passing the disorder on to her son, and a 50 per cent chance 
of passing carrier status on to her daughter. Those who carry an autosomal recessive 
disorder have, at the most, a 50 per cent chance of passing carrier status on to their 
children, and a 25 per cent chance of bearing an affected child, only if they procreate 
with another carrier of the disorder. Otherwise, the risks of passing on carrier status, 
or the disorder, are often much lower. The degree of risk depends on the risk within 
the population e.g. cystic fibrosis carriers are more common in Northern European 
populations than in Asian populations. 
Carriers are not always unaffected by the disorder for which they carry the 
mutation. For example, female carriers of X-linked adrenoleukodystrophy (a fatal 
neurodegenerative disorder characterised by learning disabilities, seizures, gait, co-
ordination difficulties and progressive dementia)12 can exhibit symptoms of the 
disorder.13 Female carriers can also be affected by haemophilia B, Duchenne muscular 
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